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CIVIL RIGHTS-TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964-
REMEDIES-TENURE AWARD TO TITLE VII COMPLAINANT- The United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has ordered a. college to
award tenure to a Title VII complainant who was a victim of unlawful
disparate treatment.
Kunda v. Muhlenberg College, 621 F.2d 532 (3d Cir. 1980).
Connie Rae Kunda was employed as a physical education instructor
at Muhlenberg College in 1966, at which time she had only a bachelor's
degree.' At that time and throughout her employment at the College,
she had reason to believe that no higher degree was required for pro-
motion or tenure.2 She was never counseled to the contrary by the
Dean or the President of the College.3 From 1972 to 1975, notwith-
standing favorable recommendations from faculty personnel and facul-
ty committees responsible for reviewing candidates for promotion and
tenure, Kunda was repeatedly denied a promotion by the Board of
Trustees of the College. The Board acted on the recommendations of
the Dean and President that her applications be denied because she
had failed to obtain a terminal degree.4 On similarly negative recom-
mendations from the Dean and President, the Board refused Kunda a
promotion and tenure in 1975, and in accordance with the recognized,
published procedure of the College,5 offered her a terminal contract.'
Kunda then instituted an action in federal district court against the
1. Kunda v. Muhlenberg College, 621 F.2d 532, 536 (3d Cir. 1980).
2. Kunda v. Muhlenberg College, 463 F. Supp. 294, 309 (E.D. Pa. 1978), affd, 621
F.2d 532 (3d Cir. 1980). The Muhlenberg College Faculty Handbook provided three alter-
native methods for achieving a promotion, only one of which necessitated the completion
of a terminal degree. The two other means were to show the "scholarly equivalent" of a
terminal degree or to show "recognized achievement in a field." Id at 298. The re-
quirements for tenure were not presented in the Faculty Handbook, but the President of
the College testified that the qualifications for tenure were similar to those published for
promotion. Id-
3. Id- at 300.
4. Id. at 300-03. The "terminal degree" is the highest degree available for any given
field of study. The terminal degree in the field of physical education is the master's
degree. Id- at 298-99. It was established at trial that the Board of Trustees had acted in
good faith in refusing Kunda's requests for promotion and tenure; the Board consistently
followed the recommendations of the President with regard to academic appointments and
honestly believed that Kunda was not qualified because she lacked a master's degree. Id.
at 303.
5. Promotion and tenure were to be achieved by faculty personnel within a stated
time schedule, and within that time schedule contracts with persons of instructor rank
could not be renewed for more than nine years. Id. at 299. By 1975, Kunda had been
employed at the rank of instructor for nine years. Id.
6. Id at 302.
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College under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,1 alleging that
Muhlenberg had subjected her to disparate treatment on the basis of
her sex by .refusing her applications for promotion and tenure.' After a
trial on the merits, the district court found that Kunda proved that she
had been discriminatorily denied promotion and tenure because the
College had required her to have a terminal degree for a promotion, a
requirement not imposed on all male faculty members, and because the
College had not counseled her that a terminal degree was essential for
tenure as it had male faculty members.9 Accordingly, the district court
ordered Muhlenberg to grant Kunda reinstatement, backpay, promo-
tion to the rank of instructor, and tenure. The tenure award was condi-
tioned upon Kunda's achievement of a master's degree within two
years."0
From this judgment and order, Muhlenberg College appealed to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit."' In a panel deci-
sion written by Judge Sloviter, the appellate court affirmed the order
of the district court.1
2
The court first addressed Muhlenberg's contention that the district
court had improperly required it to bear the burden of proving that
the College's actions were based on legitimate and nondiscriminatory
reasons and not on the plaintiffs sex.3 In response to this argument,
7. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1976 & Supp. I 1977, Supp. II 1978 & Supp. III
1979). Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides in relevant part: "It shall be un-
lawful employment practice for an employer-(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge
any individual . . . with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of such individual's ... sex.. Id § 2000e-2(a).
8. 463 F. Supp. at 297.
9. Id. at 310.
10. Id at 315.
11. Kunda v. Muhlenberg College, 621 F.2d 532 (3d Cir. 1980). The American Associa-
tion of University Professors and the United States Equal Employment Opportunity Com-
mission filed amici curiae briefs in support of Kunda. The National Institute of Indepen-
dent Colleges and Universities, the American Council on Education, and the Association
of Governing Boards of Universities and Colleges filed briefs in support of Muhlenberg.
Id. at 541.
12. The panel consisted of Chief Judge Seitz and Judges Garth and Sloviter. Judge
Garth wrote a partial dissent.
13. Id- at 540-41. Muhlenberg further argued that the plaintiff had failed to establish
a prima facie claim because she was not qualified for promotion or tenure in that she lacked
a terminal degree; that the district court was clearly erroneous in its determination
that the requirement of a terminal degree for promotion was pretextual; that the district
court was clearly erroneous in finding that the College had failed to adequately counsel
Kunda, but had counseled male faculty personnel; that the district court had improperly
failed to impose on Kunda the burden of proving that the failure to counsel was the result
of purposeful discrimination, and that she had not carried that burden; and that there was




Judge Sloviter delineated the distribution of burdens in a Title VII
disparate treatment action as set forth by the Supreme Court in
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green.'4 The complainant has the initial
burden of establishing a prima facie case from which it may be in-
ferred that the employment decision in question was motivated by
discriminatory intent.'5 A prima facie case of unlawful disparate treat-
ment is made out where it is shown that: (1) the plaintiff is a member
of a class of persons protected under Title VII; (2) he applied for and
was qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants;
(3) despite his qualifications, he was rejected; and (4) after his rejection,
the position remained open and the employer continued to seek ap-
plicants from persons of plaintiff's qualifications."6 When the plaintiff
meets this initial burden, the burden shifts to the employer to ar-
ticulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for this action." The
complainant is then given the opportunity to show that the reason ar-
ticulated by the defendant-employer is a mere pretext for the
discriminatory activity.'8 Applying these guidelines to the action of the
district court,'9 Judge Sloviter concluded that the district court had
not erroneously imposed on Muhlenberg the burden of persuasion."
Further, Judge Sloviter determined that the College had no basis for
complaint on this issue because the district court found that the Col-
lege met its burden.' According to the district court, the terminal
14. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
15. 621 F.2d at 541 (quoting 411 U.S. at 802).
16. Id.
17. 621 F.2d at 542 (quoting 411 U.S. at 802). See Board of Trustees v. Sweeney, 439
U.S. 24 (1978) (per curiam). In Sweeney the Supreme Court held that the imposition of the
burden of persuasion, rather than the burden to articulate, on the defendant employer
was reversible error. 1d. at 25. See also Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 101
S. Ct. 1089 (1981). In Burdine the Supreme Court clarified the distinction between the
burden of persuasion and the burden of articulation. To rebut the prima facie case of a
plaintiff in a Title VII disparate treatment action, the defendant need not introduce
evidence which would persuade the trier of fact that the denial of the employment benefit
to the plaintiff was predicated on lawful, rather than discriminatory, motives. The defend-
ant need only introduce admissible evidence which would allow the trier of fact rationally
to conclude that the employment decision in question had not been motivated by
discriminatory animus. Id. at 1094.
18. 621 F.2d at 542 (quoting 411 U.S. at 804-05).
19. Although the district court in Kunda properly stated in one part of its opinion
that the defendant-employer had the burden to articulate a legitimate reason for its
employment decision, see 463 F. Supp. at 309-10, elsewhere the court quoted language in-
dicating that Muhlenberg was required to bear the burden of persuasion, id. at 306 & n.2.
See 621 F.2d at 543 n.3. Muhlenberg argued that this was reversible error under
Sweeney. Brief for the Appellant at 13. See note 17 supra.
20. 621 F.2d at 543.
21. Id. at 544.
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degree constituted a legitimate nondiscriminatory requirement for
tenure and promotion.22
The court next considered Muhlenberg's argument that the district
court erred in finding that Kunda had made out a prima facie case of
discrimination with respect to the promotion decision. The College
maintained that Kunda failed to demonstrate an essential element of
her prima facie case, that she was "qualified" for a promotion.' Judge
Sloviter pointed out that because the district court's determinations
about Kunda's qualifications are factual findings, the appellate court
must accept them unless they are clearly erroneous.24 Applying this
standard of review, the court affirmed the trial court's conclusion that
the denial of Kunda's promotion was based on sexual discrimination.,
Judge Sloviter next addressed Muhlenberg's contention that the
district court erred in finding that Kunda had made out a prima facie
case of discrimination with respect to the tenure decision." The court
noted that, with respect to tenure, the district court imposed on Kunda
the burden of showing an additional element because of the unusual
nature of a tenure decisionY Judge Sloviter examined Supreme Court
decisions and found nothing to permit trial courts to require additional
proof by plaintiffs when the employer is an academic institution.28 She
noted that although the requirements for establishing a prima facie
22. 463 F. Supp. at 309-10.
23. 621 F.2d at 544.
24. Id. See FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a); see also Sweeney v. Board of Trustees, 604 F.2d 106,
109 (1st Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1045 (1980); Scott v. University of Del., 601 F.2d
76, 81 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 931 (1979). Judge Sloviter explained that a deter-
mination would not be found to be clearly erroneous unless it were completely devoid of
minimum evidentiary support displaying some hue of credibility or else bore no rational
relationship to the supportive evidentiary data. 621 F.2d at 544 (citing Krasnov v. Dinan,
465 F.2d 1298, 1302 (3d Cir. 1972), quoted in Rochez Bros., Inc. v. Rhoades, 527 F.2d 880,
887 (3d Cir. 1975)).
25. 621 F.2d at 544. Judge Sloviter concluded that the district court was not clearly
erroneous in viewof the evidence regarding Kunda's qualifications, such as the favorable
recommendations of the reviewing faculty committees and faculty personnel in Kunda's
department. Id. She then considered Muhlenberg's argument that Kunda was not qualified
because she lacked a terminal degree. The district court found this to be a legitimate
reason for denying Kunda a promotion; but it also found the requirement to be pretextual
because Muhlenberg had promoted male faculty members who had not acquired terminal
degrees. On this evidence, Judge Sloviter concluded that the district court was not clearly
erroneous in its finding of pretextuality. Id. at 545.
26. Id. at 545-46. The district court found Kunda to have made out a prima facie case
by showing that she was a member of a protected group, that she was qualified for
tenure, that she was considered for and denied tenure, and that there was some "addi-
tional element" which manifested a discriminatory motive in the decision to deny her
tenure. 463 F. Supp. at 308.
27. 621 F.2d at 545. See 463 F. Supp. at 308.
28. 621 F.2d at 545.
602 Vol. 19:599
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case set forth in McDonnell Douglas may vary in different factual
situations,9 the Supreme Court did not intend to impose a higher
burden on employees of academic institutions."
The court next examined Muhlenberg's argument that there was in-
sufficient evidence to warrant the district court's finding that Kunda
was the subject of disparate treatment because males were counseled
that a terminal degree was a prerequisite for tenure and Kunda was
not so counseled. Again, the appellate court found sufficient evidence
on the record to support the trial court's finding." Judge Sloviter
stated that the College failed to articulate a legitimate basis for its
failure to inform Kunda of the master's degree requirement. In view of
the importance that the College placed on this requirement, Judge
Sloviter maintained that the disparate treatment could reasonably
have been considered substantial by the trial court.32
Muhlenberg also argued that many of its acts which formed the
foundation for Kunda's allegation that she was treated differently from
males were acts of purely negligent oversight, and were insufficient to
prove the requisite intentional discrimination.' Judge Sloviter pointed
out that unlawful motive is permissibly inferred from differences in
treatment," and concluded that there was sufficient evidence of dif-
ferent counseling to establish intentional discrimination by
Muhlenberg.?
29. 411 U.S. at 802 n.13.
30. 621 F.2d at 545. Judge Sloviter stated that a plaintiff must establish that com-
parable males were awarded tenure or that the College was making tenure available to
comparable males. Id. at 545-46.
31. Id at 546. Males and females alike were required by the present administration
to obtain a terminal degree in order to be awarded tenure; however, not all faculty
members were notified of this requirement. Male faculty members were counseled that a
terminal degree was a prerequisite for tenure. id. at 537, 539, 546. See 463 F. Supp. at
304-05. Kunda was not so counseled, despite her initiation of meetings with the Dean and
the President to discuss her employment status and qualification. 621 F.2d at 537. See 463
F. Supp. at 309.
32. 621 F.2d at 546.
33. Brief for Appellant at 51.
34. See Kober v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 480 F.2d 240 (3d Cir. 1973) (disparate
treatment action; intentional employment discrimination necessitated a showing that the
alleged unfair practice was enaged in deliberately and not accidentally; wilfullness need
not be shown). See also International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324,
334-43 (1977) (discussion of the relevance of differences in treatment and the use of
statistical evidence in establishing unlawful motive in discriminatory pattern and prac-
tices cases).
35. 621 F.2d at 546. In making this determination, Judge Sloviter reviewed the
evidence used by the trial court to support its conclusion that the Dean and the President
failed to inform Kunda of the importance of obtaining a terminal degree, although the ad-
ministration was acutely aware of the need to counsel the faculty on this matter. The
604 Duquesne Law Review Vol. 19:599
Judge Sloviter next considered the College's argument that the por-
tion of the district court's order awarding tenure was an unwarranted
judicial infringement on academic freedom." She recognized the impor-
tance of academic freedom and acknowledged that faculty appointment
decisions are most effectively made within the university. However,
Judge Sloviter concluded that certain aspects of academic decision-
making that relate to faculty appointments do not unduly encroach
upon the educational process or the quality of education. 7
Although Judge Sloviter conceded that determinations of a university
teacher's qualifications are best left to professionals, she reasoned that
Kunda's qualifications for tenure were not in dispute.' This, Judge
Sloviter pointed out, was a unique feature which distinguished Kunda
from other cases39 in which the courts refused to examine colleges' subjec-
tive decisions on candidates' fitness for tenure." According to Judge
Sloviter, the district court's order was not a judicial grant of tenure;
rather the court was attempting to place Kunda in the position in which
she would have been but for the discrimination.'1 Because the College's
discrimination precluded Kunda from obtaining a terminal degree, the
court of appeals held that the district court properly granted Kunda the
chance to acquire a degree and thereby obtain tenure.'2 This remedy,
Judge Sloviter concluded, was an attempt by the lower court to place Kun-
da in the position she should have held but for the unlawful
discrimination. 3
evidence included statistical evidence reflecting that the Dean's recommendations were
sex-biased. Id. See 463 F. Supp. at 311.
36. See Brief of the National Institute of Independent Colleges and Universities, the
American Council on Education, and the Association of Governing Boards of Universities
and Colleges on behalf of Appellant at 12. The court noted that the portion of the order
awarding reinstatement and backpay fits within the traditional Title VII remedies. 621
F.2d at 546-47. See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 415 n.9, 414-22 (1975);
Jurinko v. Edwin L. Wiegand Co., 477 F.2d 1038, 1046 (3d Cir.), vacated and remanded on
other grounds, mem., 414 U.S. 970 (1973). Cf. Rosen v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 477
F.2d 90, 96 (3d Cir. 1973) (court awarded monetary relief to eliminate the past economic
effects of discriminatory pension plans).
37. 621 F.2d at 547.
38. Id. at 548. Judge Sloviter based her conclusion on two points. First, not only had two
faculty committees found Kunda qualified for tenure, but the Dean had asserted that Kunda's
performance merited a permanent position. Second, the College had ample opportunity at trial
to articulate any other factor on which the decision to deny tenure was based, and it did not. Id.
at 548-49.
39. See Johnson v. University of Pittsburgh, 435 F. Supp. 1328 (W.D. Pa. 1977);
Huang v. College of the Holy Cross, 436 F. Supp. 639 (D. Mass. 1977); EEOC v. Tufts Inst.
of Learning, 421 F. Supp. 152 (D. Mass. 1975).
40. 621 F.2d at 548.
41. Id. at 549. See 463 F. Supp. at 313-14.
42. 621 F.2d at 551. See note 56 infra.
43. 621 F.2d at 549. The remedial section of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
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In arriving at this conclusion, the court pointed out that employees
of educational institutions are entitled to protection under Title VII no
less than persons in nonacademic occupations." That Congress intend-
ed to protect such employees is manifestly clear from the legislative
history of the Act.'5 Consequently, Judge Sloviter concluded that in a
case such as this, in which the discrimination has been proven and the
required remedy is clear, a court cannot shirk the responsibility placed
on it by Congress. 6
In a partial dissent, Judge Garth contended that the court should not
have awarded Kunda tenure." He first noted that, despite the majority's
claims to the contrary, the court did in reality award Kunda tenure.'8 He
then pointed out that such an award contradicts the majority's
acknowledgment that courts must be vigilant not to intrude into faculty
appointment decisions.'9 According to Judge Garth, judges should not
substitute their judgments about tenure qualifications of faculty
members for those of colleges. 5
Judge Garth pointed out that Kunda must prove that, but for the
unlawful discrimination, she would have been awarded tenure by the Col-
lege.5 ' He noted that the district court never came to a clear conclusion
on this matter, but rather assumed that Kunda would have been
granted tenure had she in fact obtained her terminal degree. 2 Such an
assumption, according to Judge Garth, was without evidentiary sup-
port because a variety of factors other than the degree requirement
play a role in college decisions to award tenure.53 A decision to deny
tenure based on a single major consideration cannot warrant the con-
42 U.S.C. § 200e-5(g) (1976), provides:
If the court finds that the respondent has intentionally engaged in or is inten-
tionally engaging in an unlawful employment practice ... the court may ... order
such affirmative action as may be appropriate, which may include, but is not limited
to, reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or without back pay ... or any other
equitable relief as the court deems appropriate.
See Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 763-64 (1976); Albemarle Paper Co. v.
Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 418 (1975).
44. 621 F.2d at 550.
45. Id. at 550-51. See Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, H.R. REP. No. 238,
92d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1972] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEwS, 2137, 2155.
46. 621 F.2d at 551. See Powell v. Syracuse Univ., 580 F.2d 1150 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 984 (1978).
47. 621 F.2d at 551-52 (Garth, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
48. Id at 552 n.1 (Garth, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
49. Id. at 552 (Garth, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
50. Id.
51. Id at 552-53 (Garth, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
52. Id. at 553 (Garth, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). See 463 F. Supp.
at 313-14.
53. 621 F.2d at 554 (Garth, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
1981
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clusion that all other factors would support an award of tenure." Thus,
Judge Garth maintained that if the district court did conclude that
Kunda would have been granted tenure but for the unlawful
discrimination, that determination was clearly erroneous.55
Judge Garth concluded that Muhlenberg should be allowed to decide
whether Kunda, after obtaining a master's degree, is to be awarded
tenure.' Muhlenberg would bear the burden of persuasion that the
decision was in compliance with Title VII. According to Judge Garth,
this remedy would adequately insure that Kunda was compensated for
the lost opportunity to obtain tenure. 7
Title VII cases are characterized as disparate impact cases,"
discriminatory pattern and practices cases," and disparate treatment
cases.' Discriminatory pattern and practice cases and disparate impact
cases involve broad-based discrimination, while disparate treatment
cases involve intentional discrimination against individuals.6' Kunda v.
54. 1I Hence, Judge Garth concluded that Kunda should be restored not an award of
tenure, but rather a "lost opportunity" to obtain tenure. I& at 553 (Garth, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part).
55. Id. at 554 (Garth, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). In support of his
position, Judge Garth noted that the Dean recommended that Kunda be denied tenure in
1973 for administrative and financial reasons. The President made a negative recommen-
dation on the ground that Kunda lacked a terminal degree. Judge Garth indicated that a
refusal to award Kunda tenure based on one consideration, the lack of a terminal degree,
could not support the conclusion that all other considerations, including Kunda's perform-
ance, scholarship, financial, and administrative factors merited an award of tenure. Id. at
553-54 (Garth, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
56. Id. at 555 (Garth, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). See Richerson v.
Jones, 551 F.2d 918, 923 (3d Cir. 1977) (court should not award a particular employment
benefit unless it is shown that but for the unlawful discrimination of the employer, that
employment benefit would have been attained).
Judge Sloviter contended that Muhlenberg could not make an unbiased assessment of
Kunda's qualifications in light of the needs of the college at the time Kunda submitted her
application for tenure. 621 F.2d at 549. See id. at 555 n.2 (Garth, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
57. 621 F.2d at 553, 555 (Garth, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
58. See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). See note 68 and accom-
panying text infra. In contrast to discriminatory pattern and practice cases which require
a showing of intentional discrimination, discriminatory impact cases do not require a
showing that the allegedly unfair policy was motivated by a desire to exclude minorities.
It need only be shown that there was no manifest relationship between the policy and the
successful performance of the occupation and that the implementation of the policy had a
discriminatory effect. 401 U.S. at 431.
59. See, e.g., International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
Discriminatory pattern and practices cases usually rest on a showing of purposeful, inten-
tional discrimination in the form of a company or institutional policy designed to exclude
minorities. See note 66 and accompanying text infra.
60. See, e.g., McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). See also text ac-
companying notes 72-73 infra.
61. 431 U.S. at 358 n.44.
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Muhlenberg College is the first Title VII disparate treatment case in
which a court awarded. tenure to a complainant. Historically, the com-
plex and subjective nature of evaluations of a candidate's qualifications
for university employment have prevented court intervention in
university employment discrimination cases.2 Professing an in-
competency to resolve disputes about a professional candidate's
qualifications for an employment benefit, the federal courts during the
1960's and early 1970's avoided entanglement in cases charging
discriminatory refusal of faculty appointments.3
In the meantime, in non-academic cases, the courts had begun to
take an active role in eradicating patterns and practices which were
implemented with purposeful discrimination, as well as policies which
were discriminatory in effect." In 1971, the Supreme Court in Phillips
v. Martin Marietta Corp.65 determined that employment decision-
making predicated on overtly discriminatory qualifications or re-
quirements was unlawful under Title VII as a discriminatory pattern
or practice." In Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,6" decided the same year, the
Court ruled that employment decision-making predicated on facially
neutral qualifications or requirements which were unrelated to any
business purpose and which had a demonstrably disparate impact on
the employment of minorities, was also forbidden by Title VII."
In applying these guidelines to non-academic employment
discrimination cases, the federal courts determined that the criteria
used by employers for hiring, promotion, or other employment benefits
were subject to scrutiny under Title VII, and the employer's use of
62. See generally Divine, Women in the Academy: Sex Discrimination in University
Faculty Hiring and Promotion, 5 J.L. & EDUC. 429 (1976) (discussion of legislation enacted
to curb discriminatory employment practices in educational institutions and of the dif-
ficulties in applying this legislation to subjective decision-making) [hereinafter cited as
Divine]; Wagner, Tenure and Promotion in Higher Education in Light of Washington v.
Davis, 24 WAYNE L. REV. 95 (1977) (discussion of the obstacles confronting an individual
plaintiff in establishing discrimination in the subjective, as opposed to objective, decision-
making of educational institutions with respect to promotion and tenure) [hereinafter cited
as Wagner].
63. See, e.g., Lewis v. Chicago State College, 299 F. Supp. 1357 (N.D. Ill. 1969)
(dispute regarding black college professor's qualifications nonjusticiable).
64. See notes 58-60 and accompanying text supra.
65. 400 U.S. 542 (1971) (per curiam).
66. Id. at 544. In Phillips the employer refused to hire women with pre-school age
children; no such qualification was imposed for men. The Court ruled that Title VII pro-
hibits an employer from instituting one hiring policy for men and another for women. Id.
67. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
68. Id. at 431. In Griggs the Court held invalid an employer's requirement of a high
school diploma because such a requirement had a substantial effect on the employment of
blacks and at the same time bore no manifest relationship to the successful performance
of the job. Id.
1981
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subjective rather than objective criteria was no reason for exempting
him from the provisions of the Act. In fact, depending on the nature of
the employment, subjective evaluations of candidates for specific jobs
or employment benefits could be inherently suspect. 9
In 1972, national recognition of educational institutions'
discriminatory employment practices caused Congress to amend Title
VII to extend the protective provisions of the Act to employees of
educational institutions.7" After the amendment, courts were required
to provide relief to plaintiffs subjected to discriminatory patterns or
practices, or to policies having a discriminatory impact.7
In the following year, the Supreme Court decided McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green,7 a disparate treatment action. In McDonnell
Douglas the Supreme Court set forth the method for resolving Title
VII actions in which individuals alleged the loss of employment
benefits due to discriminatory personalized employment decisions.7"
After McDonnell Douglas, universities and colleges were prohibited
from subjecting employees to disparate treatment as well as from
engaging in discriminatory patterns and practices or implementing
policies with a discriminatory impact. Thus, judicially construed, the
Act imposed a duty on the federal courts to inquire into university
employment decision-making where that decision-making was allegedly
founded on unlawful motives. The Act imposed this duty without
regard to the nature of the action, and without regard to whether the
decision-making necessitated objective or subjective evaluations. None-
theless, a number of federal courts, notably the court in Faro v. New
York University,74 flatly refused to inquire into university decisions
regarding individual faculty appointments and promotions, reverbaliz-
69. See Rowe v. General Motors Corp., 457 F.2d 348 (5th Cir. 1972). See generally
Wagner, supra note 62, at 119.
70. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 3, 86 Stat. 103
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 200Oe-1 (1976)). See H.R. REP. No. 238, 92d Cong., 2d Sess.,
reprinted in [1972] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWs 2137, 2154-55. See also Divine, supra
note 62, at 429; Sape & Hart, Title VII Reconsidered: The Equal Employment Opportuni-
ty Act of 1972, 40 GEo. WASH. L. lEv. 824, 850-52 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Sape &
Hart].
71. Congress intended that the amended act be construed in accordance with prior
Title VII case law. See 118 CONG. REC. 7166 (1972) (remarks of Sen. Williams); 118 CONG.
REc. 7564 (1972) (remarks of Rep. Perkins). See also Sape & Hart, supra note 70, at 846.
72. 411 U.S. 792 (1973) (Title VII disparate treatment action instituted by an in-
dividual plaintiff charging that his employer had discriminatorily refused to reinstate him
following his participation in a civil rights protest against the employer).
73. Id at 802. See text accompanying notes 14-18 supra. In clarifying the application
of the Act under these circumstances, the Court noted in dictum that a dispute might well
arise over a complainant's qualifications, and clearly indicated that it was the court's
responsibility to resolve such disputes. 411 U.S. at 802 n.14.
74. 502 F.2d 1229 (2d Cir. 1974).
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ing the noninterventionist policy of the pre-amendment case law. This
noninterventionist policy resulted in a long line of unsuccessful suits
instituted by faculty members claiming disparate treatment, 7" and a
concomitant paucity of case law on the remedies available in such Title
VII actions.
The development of the law in non-academic employment discrimina-
tion stood in sharp contrast to the Faro line of cases.7" Because suc-
cessful Title VII actions were instituted against non-academic
employers, 7 the nature and types of remedies available to an aggrieved
complainant were defined. For instance, promotions 7' as well as
75. See Keyes v. Lenoir Rhyne College, 552 F.2d 579 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
904 (1977); Green v. Board of Regents, 474 F.2d 594 (5th Cir. 1973); United States v.
University of Md., 438 F. Supp. 742 (D. Md. 1977); Huang v. College of the Holy Cross, 436
F. Supp. 639 (D. Mass. 1977); Peters v. Middlebury College, 409 F. Supp. 857 (D. Vt. 1976);
EEOC v. Tufts Inst. of Learning, 421 F. Supp. 152 (D. Mass. 1975); Labat v. Board of
Higher Educ., 401 F. Supp. 753 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Moore v. Kibbee, 381 F. Supp. 834
(E.D.N.Y. 1974). But see Pace College v. Commission on Human Rights, 38 N.Y.2d 28, 339
N.E.2d 880, 377 N.Y.S.2d 471 (1975), where a college employer's blatantly discriminatory
acts were found to have warranted the New York Commission's determination that the
plaintiff had been denied a promotion and tenure in violation of Title VII. In the subse-
quent settlement agreement reached in 1976 between the parties to the action, the plain-
tiff was reinstated with tenure.
76. Non-Title VII school desegregation class actions against academic employers also
contrasted with the development of the Title VII cases. Such suits rested on statistical
evidence in contrast to Title VII disparate treatment suits which required subjective
evaluations of particular faculty appointments. The courts awarded various discretionary
remedies in these successful actions, including the recognition of de facto tenure, see
McFerren v. County Bd. of Educ., 455 F.2d 199 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 934 (1972);
and the imposition of quotas for hiring minorities into "permanent positions," see Morgan
v. Kerrigan, 530 F.2d 431 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 935 (1976).
Initially it appeared that Title VII disparate impact or discriminatory pattern and
practice actions, which also rested primarily on statistical evidence, would prove to be
similarly fruitful for aggrieved faculty members. See Mecklenburg v. Montana State Bd.
of Regents, 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 462 (D. Mont. 1976) (court held that damages along
with any necessary particular relief, be awarded in a class action alleging discrimination
in promotion and tenure). Because of the personalized nature of faculty appointments,
however, suits relating to broad-based discrimination in the form of a single policy or
practice affecting numerous individuals are rare. See Wagner, supra note 62, at 117. In
such cases it is difficult to present sufficient statistics to warrant the presumption of pur-
poseful discrimination, and the Supreme Court has made it clear that such a presumption
will not arise from a mere showing that the work force fails to mirror the general popula-
tion. Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299 (1977).
77. See, e.g., Smith v. Fletcher, 393 F. Supp. 1366 (S.D. Tex. 1975), modified, 559 F.2d
1014 (5th Cir. 1977); Brown v. Rollins, Inc., 397 F. Supp. 571 (W.D. N.C. 1974); Shaffield v.
Northrop Worldwide Aircraft Servs., Inc., 373 F. Supp. 937 (M.D. Ala. 1974).
78. See, e.g., Sherrill v. J.P. Stevens & Co., 410 F. Supp. 770 (W.D.N.C. 1975), affd,
551 F.2d 308 (4th Cir. 1977) (upon finding that the plaintiff had been denied training and a
promotion due to the discriminatory animus of the employer, court ordered the defendant-
employer to train and promote one of the individual plaintiffs).
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retroactive seniority 9 were held to be permissible forms of non-
monetary relief.
The noninterventionist policy of the federal courts in academic
disparate treatment suits slowly began to change in 1977 and 1978. In
cases not involving complex professional evaluations, the courts would
not defer to the employment decision of the educational institution." In
the more complex cases, courts, while paying lip-service to Faro, did
intrude upon the subjective decision-making processes of higher educa-
tional institutions by conducting extensive inquiries into the qualifica-
tions of faculty personnel alleging discrimination by their university
employers.81
Finally, this trend of increasing judicial activism crested in Sweeney
v. Board of Trustees,82 in which the United States Court of Appeals for
the First Circuit repudiated the Faro rationale as a subversion of the
function and purposes of Title VII. In Sweeney the plaintiff successful-
ly established that she had been denied a promotion due to unlawful
discrimination by her employer college. In accordance with its broad
discretionary powers to grant affirmative relief under Title VII, the
Sweeney court awarded her a retroactive promotion.83
In light of the prior judicial inactivism in academic disparate treat-
ment cases, the tenure remedy in Kunda is novel. However, the impact
of Kunda is uncertain because it is unclear what determinations a col-
lege must make about a candidate's qualifications before the court will
award tenure.
The district court's findings about Kunda's qualifications are
obscure. The district court found that Kunda proved in her prima facie
case that she was qualified for tenure even without a master's
79. See, e.g., International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977)
(persons denied promotions and seniority because of employer's unlawful discriminatory prac-
tices were promotions with retroactive seniority).
80. See United States v. Wattsburg Area School Dist., 429 F. Supp. 1370 (W.D. Pa.
1977) (female teacher, with clearly superior academic qualifications, found to have been
discriminatorily refused employment by a primary school principal).
81. See, e.g., Johnson v. University of Pittsburgh, 435 F. Supp. 1328 (WD. Pa. 1977).
In Johnson the court assessed the plaintiffs qualifications in light of the needs of the
university's program, making an in depth inquiry into her field of research and scholastic
background. Id. at 1365-66. However, the court denied relief to the plaintiff, finding that
she failed to demonstrate that the university-employer's reasons for denying her promo-
tion and tenure were pretextual. Id. at 1370.
82. 569 F.2d 169 (1st Cir.), vacated and remanded on other grounds, per curiam, 439
U.S. 24 (1978). In contrast to the Faro court, whose rationale fostered a policy of judicial
inactivism, the Sweeney court recognized its congressionally imposed "responsibility ...
to provide a forum for the litigation of complaints of sex discrimination in institutions of
higher learning as readily as for other Title VII suits." Id. at 176.
83. Id. at 171.
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degree." The district court based its finding on favorable recommenda-
tions from faculty personnel and committees responsible for reviewing
candidates for promotion and tenure. It then noted that because there
was a "virtual" unanimity of those responsible for reviewing Kunda's
qualifications, it would be loathe to act as a "super tenure review com-
mittee" by overturning a decision of those reviewing committees."5
This language is strongly reminiscent of the language used by the
Faro court which admonished courts not to act as super tenure review
committeees. 8
The district court then found that the defendant articulated a
legitimate reason for its action: Kunda's lack of a terminal degree. '
This articulated reason was found by the court not to be pretextual,"
but the court went on to find that Kunda's failure to obtain a master's
degree was due to the defendant's discriminatory failure to counsel
her." Thus, the court concluded that although Kunda was not qualified
without a master's degree, she did not have a master's degree because
of the College's unlawful disparate treatment.9 Because the trial court,
in discussion Kunda's prima facie case, had already found her to be
qualified without a master's degree, it follows that she would have
been qualified if she had obtained the requisite degree. Yet, the trial
court made no express conclusion to this effect. Thus, the only time
the district court discussed Kunda's qualifications was in its considera-
tion of her prima facie case-and that discussion was framed in
language reminiscent of Faro.9'
Focusing on the district court's noninterventionist language, Judge
Sloviter maintained that the court did not award Kunda tenure."2 Kunda's
performance and qualifications were not in dispute." Judge Sloviter im-
plied that the College made a final determination that Kunda was
qualified for tenure, and that the court simply deferred to that decision. In
fact, however, the court's findings that Kunda was qualified was a judicial
decision, because no final determination was ever made by the College. As
Judge Garth pointed out in his dissent, the Board of Trustees of the Col-
lege had the responsibility of assessing Kunda's qualifications in light of
84. 463 F. Supp. at 308.
85. Id.
86. See 502 F.2d at 1232. Although this language worked to the plaintiff's advantage
in this case, it manifests a judicial deference that has in the past posed an obstacle to Ti-
tle VII plaintiffs. See text accompanying note 75 supra.
87. 463 F. Supp. at 309-10.
88. Id. at 310.
89. Id. at 310-11.
90. Id. at 313.
91. See note 86 supra.
92. 621 F.2d at 549.
93. Id. at 548.
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the needs of the College," and the Board never concluded that Kunda's
performance warranted an award of tenure.'-
If the court is requiring a final determination by a college before it
will award tenure, this requirement is inconsistent with the Supreme
Court's teachings. The appropriate remedy in a Title VII action is not
contingent on a final determination by an employer, who is concededly
guilty of unlawful discrimination. The clear teaching of the Supreme
Court cases is that proof establishing a prima facie case in a Title VII
action raises the rebuttable presumption that the alleged lost employ-
ment benefit would have been granted-but for the unlawful
discrimination of the employer.9" This premise has been enunciated in
pattern and practice cases,97 and there is no reason to presume a dif-
ferent rule should apply to disparate treatment cases. Thus, the award
of tenure of Kunda should have turned on whether the inference raised
by Kunda's prima facie case, that she was "entitled" to tenure, was dispel-
94. Id. at 552 (Garth, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The majority
acknowledged that the Board of Trustees was vested with the power to award promotion
and grant tenure. Id. at 535.
95. Not only was there an absence of a favorable decision by the Board; in contradic-
tion to Judge Sloviter's contention that there was no dispute regarding Kunda's qualifica-
tions, see text accompanying note 93 supra, the Board contested Kunda's qualifications for
tenure. The College argued not only that Kunda was unqualified for tenure because she
lacked a terminal degree, but also that the Board found her unqualified for that privilege
disregarding the requirement of a master's degree. Brief for Appellant at 34.
96. See Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. at 769-70, 772. See also note 97 in-
fra.
97. In discriminatory pattern and practice suits, the prima facie case is made out by
demonstrating the existence of a discriminatory hiring pattern and practice. International
Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. at 358 (citing Franks v. Bowman Transp.
Co., 424 U.S. at 772). The establishment of the prima facie case raises a presumption that
the individual plaintiff is "entitled" to the employment benefit denied by the employer.
431 U.S. at 362; 424 U.S. at 772. Although Judge Garth argued that an award of tenure
was an inappropriate remedy because Kunda proved only that she lost the "opportunity"
for tenure, see note 53 supra, the Supreme Court has indicated that this presumption of
entitlement is raised even if the employer's discriminatory activity constitutes a
foreclosure of an opportunity to achieve that employment benefit, rather than a denial of
an assured benefit, see 431 U.S. at 362, 368 n.52, 371; 424 U.S. at 773 n.32. If such
presumptions are not rebutted, the court is obliged to order the defendant-employer to
grant the plaintiff that employment benefit which was denied. 424 U.S. at 773. In this
manner, the court determines whether the requested relief would have been obtained but
for the unlawful discrimination of the employer. See id. at 758.
In contrast to pattern and practice suits, the disparate treatment plaintiff has a more
stringent and exacting burden in making out his prima facie case. The plaintiff must
demonstrate that his rejection did not result from a lack of qualifications or an absence of
a vacancy in the job sought. 431 U.S. at 358 n.44. This initial showing raises the in-




led by rebutting evidence of an unfulfilled employment prerequisite." The
resolution of this issue necessitated a judicial determination that Kunda
would have qualified for tenure had she attained a terminal degree, and
that aside from the degree requirement, she was as qualified as those per-
sons who had been awarded tenure. It is the court's congressionally man-
dated responsibility to conduct an inquiry into university decision-making
by assessing the plaintiff's qualifications and the probable action that
an employer would have taken in light of his legitimate employment
needs and a nondiscriminatory application of his employment re-
quirements.9 As noted by Judge Sloviter, no additional elements
should be required in Title VII cases simply because the suit is lodged
against an academic employer."0 Thus, a finding that Kunda made out
an unrebutted prima facie case that she was entitled to tenure must
result in an award of tenure.
The tenure remedy in Kunda fulfills a fundamental purpose of Title
VII, to "make whole" the victims of disparate treatment. The question
remains as to how the courts will evaluate the subjective and ad-
ministrative factors which are an integral part of professional employ-
ment decision-making. The Faro court maintained that they could not
and should not. The decision in Kunda, while phrased in language of
judicial deference, can hardly be reconciled with Faro in that the
tenure remedy involved a clear intervention in a matter traditionally
within the exclusive province of universities and colleges.
Jane Roberts Cobb
98. See notes 84-88 and accompanying text supra.
99. See International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. at 372; Franks v.
Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. at 769, 772 n.32.
100. 621 F.2d at 545.
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